Multicast gives professional large-scale content distribution by providing an efficient transport mechanism for one-to-many and many-to-many communications. There is a number of security issues in multicast communication directly related to the specific nature of multicast. In our paper, we concentrate on the multicast authentication problem. Important requirements of multicast communication protocols are: to perform authentication in real-time, to resist packet loss to have low communication and computation overheads. In the present paper, a scheme for authenticating multicast data applications is proposed. In order to provide authentication, the proposed scheme uses both public key signature and symmetric key functions. It is based on the idea of dividing the stream into blocks of m packets. The proposed scheme resists packet loss by using erasure code functions over the signature. To resist pollution attacks, our scheme computes the symmetric encryption of the erasure code output. To resist replay attacks, a counter number is added to each packet. The proposed scheme is compared to other multicast authentication protocols. The comparison shows that the proposed scheme has the following advantages: first, it has low computation and communication overheads. Also it has reasonable buffer requirements. Furthermore, it resists packet loss, pollution and replay attacks. The proposed protocol called Latif-Aslan-Ramly (LAR) is analyzed using BAN logic. The analysis shows that LAR achieves the authentication goals. 245 978-1-4244-2116-9/08/$25.00 ©2008 IEEE
I. INTRODUCTION
Multicast enables efficient large-scale content distribution by providing an efficient transport mechanism to communicate between one-to-many and many-to-many communications. Over the years, multicast has been the topic of many research.
Today, applications that are of multicast nature have increased (for example: video conferencing, distance learning, pay per view TV, financial stock quote distribution, etc). One of the important tasks for the use of multicast communication; is the authenticity. Authenticity: means that the receiver must be able to verify the identity of the data's source. First level of functionality is for the receiver to be able to verify that the data is from a group member. The next level of functionality is for the receiver to be able to verify that it is from an authorized sender. The most precise functionality is for the receiver to be able to determine the exact identity of the sender.
In case of multicast communication, authentication is a difficult problem, since it requires that a large number of recipients must verify the data sender. Assume a group containing n members. A simple solution is to use a shared symmetric key between the sender and each receiver to calculate different Message Authentication Codes (MACs). Then, the sender appends the calculated MACs to the group message. Upon receiving the message, each receiver ensures the authenticity of the message using the MAC calculated by the key shared between it and the sender. This solution has a high communication overhead since in order to ensure the authenticity of a message n MACs must be appended to it. Another solution is to use the private key of the sender to sign a hash of the entire message. This solution suffers from the high computation and communication overheads since the signature algorithms require large computation and produce large output signatures. The abovementioned solutions do not resist packet loss, since the loss of any packet of the message will cause the inability to authenticate the received packets. This is due to the fact that the MAC or the signature is calculated over the whole message. In order to resist packet loss, one solution is to calculate MAC or signature for every packet. This solution will suffer from a large amount of communication and computation overheads. Two solutions for providing multicast authentication are proposed: the first is to amortize signature over several packets ([1] , [2] , [3] , [4] , [5] ). The second is to design more efficient signature schemes ( [6] , [7] ). While designing more efficient signature schemes overcomes the computational overhead problem, it still suffers from the communication overhead problem. On the other hand, amortizing signature over several packets overcomes the communication overhead problem. In this paper we propose LAR which is a new scheme for multicast authentication. LAR uses both public key signature and UMAC functions. The proposed scheme has low computation and communication overheads. The paper is organized as follows: in the next section, related works are reviewed, then, a description of the proposed scheme is given in Section III. In Section IV, a comparison of the proposed scheme with other proposed schemes is given. The paper concluded in the last section. Finally, In Appendix logical analysis of LAR is detailed.
II. RELATED WORK
The techniques proposed to solve the multicast authentication problem are divided into two main categories: design more efficient signature schemes and amortize the signature over several packets. For the first scheme, we have a technique called BIBA [7] proposed by Perrig. Perrig proposed a one-time signature and broadcast authentication protocol. It has a low verification overhead and a relatively small signature size. BIBA enhances the computation overhead, but its communication overhead is still large. Reyzin and Reyzin [5] proposed a one-time signature scheme, which is faster than BIBA and has a slightly lower communication overhead. The two schemes are unsuitable for real-time applications for their large communication overhead.
For the second solution, that is to amortize the signature over several packets, we have an efficient scheme that has been proposed by Wong and Lam [1] . Although this scheme overcomes the computational problem, it suffers from the communication overhead problem. Wong and Lam proposed a tree chaining technique, this technique divides the stream of data packets into blocks of m packets (P 1 , P 2, P 3, …….., P m-2, P m-1, P m ) and forms a tree arrangement of degree 2 to perform authentication as shown in Fig.1 . Each block of certain number of messages can be authenticated with one signature. Each leaf node is a message digest of a data packet, and the parent nodes are message digests of the two children nodes. The root node is the message digest for the block, which is signed once for the entire group. To verify the packets, the receiver recreates the path from the received packet up to the root, computes the digest of each node, and compares the computed root to the signed received root. Therefore, the sibling of each node along the packet's path must be sent to help the receiver to authenticate the packet. Although this work solves the problem of packet loss, it has a big problem that it needs high computation and communication overheads. Perrig et al proposed TESLA scheme [8] . TESLA scheme provides authentication without considering packet loss rate. It has many advantages like: Low computation overhead, Low per-packet communication overhead, Strength to loss, every packet which is received in time can be authenticated and no buffering is needed at sender. However it requires time synchronization between the sender and the receiver; and in order to satisfy the security condition, the sending rate must be slower than the network delay from the sender to the receiver. In TESLA, the stream is divided into blocks of m packets. Then, the sender selects a random number and uses it as a key; say k m then by applying a pseudo random function (F) m times can calculate m keys; where k m-1 =F(k m ) and k m-2 =F(k m-1 ) and so on. When the receiver received these keys, it uses them to authenticate the received stream by calculating the MACs.
Finally, Ritesh Mukherjee proposed the symmetric message authentication scheme [9] : This scheme is based on symmetric message authentication codes (MACs) to add the required data source authentication and data integrity check to secure the group communication. It uses asymmetric encryption, and a symmetric MAC. To provide authentication, a symmetric key is shared among all group members. This symmetric key is a unique shared secret used for authentication. Every time a sender wants to send a message to the group, it adds an index to the packet, a counter "c" and a random number "k". The index is a number assigned by the group manager to a particular sender for uniquely identifying it during a multicast session. It then encrypts the packet with the asymmetric encryption key, and then it calculates a MAC on the ciphertext using the symmetric key. After that it attaches "k" and the MAC to the packet. The packet structure is shown in The receiver computes the MAC of the encrypted sent data, check the pollution attack by ensuring that the packet was not modified during transit, then decrypts the data and gets the random number k, now the receiver compares this k with the sent random number k, the sent index identifies the particular sender, this achieves the data source authentication. The symmetric key used is generated by the group manager and distributed to the group members with the private decryption key when the members join the multicast group. This protocol consumes large computation overhead. The receiver needs to calculate the MAC of the cipher, make a comparison operation, make a decryption operation, and make another comparison, which may not be practical in case of real time applications. In the next section, a description of LAR is given.
III. LATIF-ASLAN-RAMLY MULTICAST AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOL (LAR)
In this section, we will present a description of LAR and its features.
III.A. Description of LAR
The detailed procedure of LAR protocol is given below. At the sender side: The stream is divided into blocks of m packets (P 1 , P 2 , P 3 ,…, P m-2 , P m-1 , P m ). The sender applies the digital signature on the group key K g . The digital signature is done by any public key system like RSA [10] . The sender applies the erasure code function on the signature. The output of the erasure code function is partitioned into m symbols: S 1 , S 2 , S 3 , ……., S m as shown in Fig.3 . Assume the erasure code function can resist packet loss of rate R. Each time the sender wants to send a message to the group, he adds a counter "c" to the packet. The system uses this counter to rearrange the received packets, and have to resist replay attack. Then the sender encrypts the output of the erasure code function S 1 , S 2 , S 3 , ……., S m using symmetric key system like AES [11] by the group key K g . The output of encryption will be divided into m symbols which will be appended with the m data packets before sending. Then, the sender calculates the UMAC [12] value of P i , concatenated with the corresponding S i key, and the corresponding counter c i as shown in Fig.3 . This last operation will result also m symbols that will be appended with the m data packets. The use of MAC algorithm has the same security strength as hash functions with lower output length [10] . Finally, the sender output will be: the data as a data packet appended with its counter, the UMAC results and the result of the encryption operation.
At the receiver side: each received packet P' i contains the following data: Packet P i itself, the counter c i , the corresponding output of the UMAC function, and the corresponding output of the encryption operation. Upon receiving the stream, each receiver makes a decryption operation on the encrypted data (D Kg (E Kg (S i ))); where E y (x) represents symmetric encryption of x using symmetric key y, and D y (x) represents symmetric decryption of x using symmetric key y. Now each receiver has the ability to authenticate the packets, by computing the UMAC function of each packet; if it equals the same received UMAC symbol, this implies that the received packet has been sent by one of the group members. If the two values are different, this implies that the received packet is corrupted and it is discarded. The receiver can calculate the authentication information using the erasure decode function, after receiving m(1-R) correct packets. The receiver stores the received packets in a buffer of length m for example. So the new arrived packet counter c 1 must fall within the range c 1 to c 1 +m. If the received counter number already has an existing packet in the buffer then the received packet is considered a duplicate and is discarded. The counter c i is sent free to give the ability to the receiver to compute the UMAC function, and is sent included in the UMAC function to preserve its security from intruders.
The sender output: Fig.3 . LAR protocol
III.B Features of LAR Protocol
• The digital signature is distributed along the data packets after applying the erasure code function on it so the system avoids the problem of signature loss and sending the signature more than one time.
• The system has a resistance to packet loss as along as it is below a certain loss rate R. • The system has a very important feature that each packet has a witness that helps us to decide to use this packet in the erasure decoding function or not. This witness is the result of applying the UMAC function on the result of the decryption operation concatenated with the sent packet. This means that the LAR protocol overcomes the pollution attacks problem. We select some protocols that also support the real time communication; which are suitable in the case of most internet applications, they are: Wong-Lam [1] , TESLA [8] , and Ritesh Mukherjee [9] schemes. consumes time. Our scheme solves this problem by using the symmetric encryption which is more easy and faster. Most of the presented schemes have a resistance against packet loss; our scheme solves this problem by using the erasure code function. Our scheme can restore the lost packets as long as the loss rate is under certain loss rate R. Wong-Lam protocol has a low computation overhead at sender, and a resistance against any packet loss, but it has a very high communication overhead and a larger computation overhead at receiver compared to LAR.
In Table. From Table. 2 our scheme has the lowest communication overhead compared to other schemes, except in case of TESLA protocol; our scheme has a communication overhead comparable to it. On the other hand, TESLA protocol needs time synchronization between the sender and the receiver; which is a very big problem. Furthermore, it has no resistance against packet loss.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Nowadays, Multicast communication becomes a very important field. There are many topics of research in this field, which have many alternatives and challenges. Its importance is a logic result after its wide applications, but because of its properties, its security becomes somehow hard.
A new protocol for multicast group authentication was presented. The proposed authentication scheme LAR can resist packet loss by using the erasure code function. To resist pollution attacks, LAR uses the symmetric key function. To resist replay attack LAR uses a counter number. To evaluate the performance of our scheme, we compare our protocol with some of other previously proposed schemes; they are Wong-Lam, TESLA, and Ritesh Mukherjee schemes. The proposed scheme can resist pollution attacks, packet loss, and replay attack. It achieves these goals with low computation and communication overheads compared to known multicast authentication schemes. We make verification to the presented protocol using BAN logic. The verification results show that the protocol achieves its goals, free from redundancy and free from any types of known attacks.
APPENDIX LOGICAL ANALYSIS OF LAR
We have used Burrows, Abadi, and Needham (BAN) logic [13] to validate our model; this is done using logics developed specifically for the analysis of knowledge and belief. The analysis of our protocol is performed as follows:
• Assumptions about the initial state are given.
• Description of the protocol using Logical formulas is written. • The logical formulas are applied to the assumptions and description formulas, in order to discover the beliefs held by the parties in the protocol. We will assume that we have a group G that consists of the members: A, B, C, D, ……... We will take A and B as an example to prove the authentication operation. We can represent the protocol in one step. The following formula for describing the operation of the protocol: : indicates the UMAC of the data packet concatenated with the counter concatenated with the digital signature. We will consider the multicast authentication is completed between principals A and B, if there is a data packet "X" which the receiver B believes that it is sent by A. Thus authentication between A and B will be completed if:
where the symbol ≡ | means believes. Now, we transform the protocol as the following:
Where; #(X): X is fresh. It means X has never been said before the current run of the protocol.
The initial assumptions are given by:
6.
Equation (3) indicates that A believes that K a is the public key of A, (4) indicates that B believes that K a is the public key of A, (5) indicates that A and B share the key K g , (6) indicates that B believes that A has jurisdiction over P i , (7) indicates that B believes that c i is fresh, and (8) indicates that B believes that A has jurisdiction over c i .
Using (2) , and (5) , and applying the message-meaning rule [14] , we obtain:
where; P |~ X: means P at some time sent a message that contained X. we do not know exactly when the message was sent.
Using (1) and applying the interpretation rule (I2) in [13] , where I2 formula is given below: is not a redundancy; it is added to avoid pollution attacks. Also, from (9) and using interpretation rule, we can obtain:
Form (12) and (4) by applying the message meaning rule we can say:
We will assume that (14) is used as an index for the rest of the group to know the identity of the sender, and by assuming that all the group is honest we can put the following formula assuming the group members are honest:
Where: G: is a certain group in a multicast communication session. A: is the intended sender. B: certain receiver from the group. X,Y: the sent data.
From (15) and by using (12) and (13) Using (6) and (19) and by applying the jurisdiction rule we can get:
From (19 and 20), we deduce that: LAR achieves its goals, and it is free from redundancy, and it is free from any type of known attacks like: replay attacks, message modification, insertion, or deletion.
